IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN A STATE WITH AN IMPORTED FAST REACTOR AND A CLOSED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

The implementation of the IAEA safeguards in the non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) that has imported the fast-neutron reactor with nuclear fuel cycle facilities is considered. The features of fast reactors that should be taken into account when preparing them for export together with CNFC technologies considering the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the importing state, are noted. These include high mass fraction of plutonium in fresh fuel loads and handling of a large amounts of fissile materials in the technological cycles of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. It is concluded that it is possible to implement the effective IAEA safeguards in the state importing such reactor and nuclear fuel cycle facilities considering their physical and design features and innovative technologies, including those used in the IAEA safeguards implementation.

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